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Abstract
A setting of reliance investments is explored where one of the par-
ties to a contract obtains private information concerning his utility or
cost function that remains hidden to the other party and to courts.
As a consequence, it will be a diﬃcult task to award expectation dam-
ages corrrectly to a party with private information who suﬀfers from
breach of contract. While a revelation mechanism would exist that
leads to the ﬁrst best solution, assessing expectation damages cor-
rectly turns out to be at odds with ex post eﬃciency. I conclude
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damages falls short of what more general mechanisms could achieve.
Keywords: reliance investments, expectation damages, breach of
contract, hidden information
JEL classiﬁcation: K12, D82
∗address: Urs Schweizer, Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee
24, 53113 Bonn, Germany, schweizer@uni-bonn.de
†Support through SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged.
11 Introduction
Actions of a party to a contract are called reliance investments if they are
taken in reliance on performance of the other party. Reliance investments en-
hance the value of performance but must be undertaken before the promisee
knows whether the promisor will perform.
Suppose one of the parties fails to perform as speciﬁed in the contract.
Then the other party may seek recovery by claiming expectation damages. If
expectation damages are granted in the correct amount the party who suﬀers
from breach will be made equally well oﬀ as if the breaching party had met
his obligation.
It is a common tenet of the economic analysis of contract law that, under
the expectation measure, there will be incentives toward excessive reliance.
Shavell (1980) had established the overreliance result in a formal model (for
a more recent statement of the result, see Shavell (2004)). Edlin and Reichel-
stein (1996), however, called the overreliance result in question. In a setting
of quantity choice, they showed that the expectation measure provides eﬃ-
cient incentives if reliance investments are one-sided, if the contract speciﬁes
some suitable intermediate quantity of trade as performance obligation and
if, ex post, ineﬃcient performance choices are renegotiated.
Whether expectation damages provide eﬃcient incentives or not, for being
granted, they must be veriﬁed in front of courts. In particular, if asymmetric
information is involved, this may be a diﬃcult task. The party suﬀering
from breach may be denied recovery just because courts feel unable to assess
expectation damages correctly.
The present paper takes up the issue of assessing expectation damages
under asymmetric information. A setting of one-sided reliance investments is
explored where one of the parties receives information about his utility, proﬁt
or cost function that remains hidden to the other party and to courts. The
setting is simple enough that a revelation mechanism of the Clarke-Groves
type would easily generate the ﬁrst best solution. Yet, as will be shown, the
transfer payments arising from such a mechanism do not reﬂect expectation
damages correctly.
For this reason, the paper rather examines the class of mechanisms that
would assess expectation damages correctly. In its general form, such a mech-
2anism deﬁnes a transfer schedule that speciﬁes net payments due as a function
of performance choice, of reliance investments (if veriﬁable) and of a message
sent by the informed party. The transfer schedule is said to reﬂect expecta-
tion damages correctly if, along the equilibrium path, transfer payments are
consistent with correct expectation damages, state by state.
As it turns out, assessing expectation damages correctly comes at a price
in terms of eﬃciency loss. It is shown that mechanisms assessing expecta-
tion damages correctly will implement performance decisions only that are
constant over states. Typically, such outcomes fail to be ex post eﬃcient.
Therefore, assessing expectation damages correctly is at odds with ex post
eﬃciency.
Notice, in contrast to the informational setting of Edlin and Reichelstein,
renegotiations would not oﬀer an easy remedy for ex post eﬃciency in the
present framework. In fact, as follows from the impossibility result of My-
erson and Satterthwaite (1981), asymmetric information may be a source of
transaction costs and, hence, the Coase Theorem may fail to hold. In any
case, renegotiations under asymmetric information cannot be expected to
r e s t o r ee xp o s te ﬃciency as would be the case under symmetric information.
Legal practice facing problems of hidden information usually takes re-
sort to objective damage measures. Such measures are based on prudent or
reasonable investment behavior and/or on the average type of a ﬁctitious
agent. By construction, these measures diﬀer from subjective expectation
damages that were required to compensate the promisee for her loss. Worse,
while failing to assess expectation damages correctly, such schemes also fail
to generate eﬃcient performance outcomes.
Some legal systems allow the promisee to opt for recovery of reliance
expenditures if expectation damages cannot be veriﬁed in front of courts.
Unfortunately, in the setting of the present paper, this option also fails to
restore ex post eﬃciency.
These ﬁndings support the following conclusion. While expectation dam-
ages seem to work well under symmetric information, at least if continuous
p e r f o r m a n c ec h o i c ei sa ts t a k e ,t h ep e r f o r m a n c eo fe x p e c t a t i o nd a m a g e su n -
d e ra s y m m e t r i ci n f o r m a t i o nf a l l ss h o r to fw h a tm o r eg e n e r a lm e c h a n i s m sm a y
achieve.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic reliance
3setting and derives the ﬁrst best solution, as a reference point, by backwards
induction. Section 3 contains the main ﬁndings of the paper. In particular,
it is shown that transfer schedules reﬂecting expectation damages correctly
provide incentives for outcomes that are constant over states and, hence,
will typically fail to be ex post eﬃcient. The overreliance result of Shavell
is also brieﬂy revisited. In a setting of complete information, overreliance is
shown to be due to binary performance choice and not to a basic defect of the
expectation measure as such. Section 4 investigates incentives arising from
common methods of legal practice. Neither objectifying expectation damages
nor allowing to opt for reliance instead of expectation damages would provide
incentives for state-contingent outcomes. Section 5 concludes. The proof of
the main result is relegated to the appendix.
2 The general setting
Two risk-neutral parties A and B — think of a buyer and seller — have signed
a contract. Thereafter, party A chooses reliance investments r ∈ R =
[0,∞) before nature reveals an information parameter θ from an interval
Θ =[ θL,θH] of the real line. Information, however, remains private to party
A or, alternatively, to party B. Nature’s move is purely random. At the ﬁnal
stage, the performance decision q ∈ Q is due. Q is assumed to be a subset
of the real line and may consist of an interval Q =[ qL,q H] or it may be just
binary Q = {qL,q H} with the interpretation perform (qH) and not perform
(qL). In the case of continuous performance choice, think of q as the quantity
or quality of a good to be exchanged or of the speed of delivery. Edlin and
Reichelstein (1996) deal with continuous performance choice whereas Shavell
(1980) examines binary choice. The present setting allows for both versions.
The social surplus amounts to W(r,θ,q). If it is party A who obtains pri-
vate information then social surplus is assumed to be of structure W(r,θ,q)=
V (r,θ,q) − C(q) − r where V (r,θ,q) denotes A’s utility or proﬁtf u n c t i o n
and C(q) party B’s cost function. Similarly, if it is party B who obtains pri-
vate information then the assumed structure of social surplus is W(r,θ,q)=
V (r,q) − C(θ,q) − r. In either case, at the investment stage, the eﬀect of
reliance investments on social surplus is uncertain.
As a reference point, the ﬁrst best solution is constructed by backwards




maximizes social surplus at the performance stage where reliance investments





maximize the ex ante expected social surplus. Notice, here and elsewhere in
the paper, the expectation operator is taken with respect to the distribution











must also hold. The following assumptions will be imposed.
Assumptions
(a) If θ < θ
0 then the diﬀerence W(r,θ
0,q)−W(r,θ,q) is strict monoton-
ically increasing as a function of q.
(b) If q<q 0 then the diﬀerence W(r,θ,q0) − W(r,θ,q) is monotonically
increasing as a function of r.
(c) If q<q 0 then V (·,q) <V(·,q 0).
Notice, in a diﬀerentiable setting, (a) would hold if the second derivative
Wqθ > 0 is positive. This condition is well-known from mechanism design as
the single-crossing property. Similarly, (b) would hold, if the second deriv-
ative Wqr > 0 is positive, which means, that, net of investment costs, the
marginal social product is an increasing function of investments. Assumption
(c) requires utility or proﬁt of party A net of investment costs to be strict
monotonically increasing as a function of performance choice.1
1While some readers may feel more familiar with the diﬀerentiable version of the above
assumptions, to avoid mathematical subtleties of mechanism design and to treat binary
and continuous performance choice in an uniﬁed framework, I prefer the version that avoids
calculus.
5The following two auxiliary results are established for later reference. Un-
der the single-crossing property, the socially best response is a monotonically
increasing function of private information. Moreover, there exist constant
performance decisions such that the ex ante optimal reliance investments are
lower and higher, respectively, as compared to eﬃcient investments.
Lemma 1 Suppose assumption (a) is met. If θ < θ
0 then q+(r,θ) ≤ q(r,θ
0).
Notice, in a diﬀerentiable setting where the socially best response is an
interior solution, the socially best response will be even strict monotonically
increasing as a function of private information. In particular, ex post eﬃcient
performance choice will typically be state-contingent.
Lemma 2 Suppose assumption (b) is met. Then, for i = L,H, there exists
ri ∈ argmax
r∈R E[W(r,θ,q i)]
such that rL ≤ r∗ ≤ rH.
Notice, in a diﬀerentiable setting with continuous performance choice, it
follows from Lemma 2 that an intermediate performance decision qoo ∈ Q,
















oo) − r (1)
must hold if it is party B who obtains private information.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .
Take any performance decision q>q +(r,θ























6It follows that no performance decision in the range above q+(r,θ
0) maximizes
W(r,θ,q) and, hence, Lemma 1 is established.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .





∗,θ,q L) ≤ W(r,θ,q
∗(θ)) − W(r,θ,q L)
and, hence, that
E [W(r,θ,q L)] ≤ E [W(r






must hold. Therefore, E [W(r,θ,q L)] attains a maximum in the range r ≤ r∗
and the ﬁrst claim of Lemma 2 is established. The second claim of Lemma
2 can be established similarly.
Observe, if the diﬀerence in assumption (b) is strictly monotonically in-
creasing in r and if eﬃcient performance is inner (i.e. q∗(θ) ∈ (qL,q H))
with positive probability then the claims of Lemma 2 would hold for any
ri ∈ argmaxr∈R E[W(r,θ,q i)].
3 Mechanisms reﬂecting expectation damages
This section presents the main results of the paper. Since private informa-
tion is involved it may be diﬃcult for courts to award the correct amount of
damages. To cope with such problems of hidden information, parties may
take resort to sophisticated revelation mechanisms. In fact, the general set-
ting as introduced in the previous section would allow implementing the ﬁrst
best solution with a mechanism of the Clarke-Groves type. Yet, transfer pay-
ments under eﬃcient revelation mechanisms turn out to diﬀer from correct
expectation damages signiﬁcantly.
Therefore, in the following, rather provisions are examined that would
allow awarding correct expectation damages even under asymmetric infor-
mation. More precisely, I shall investigate the class of mechanisms that are
reﬂecting expectation damages along the equilibrium path correctly. Simi-
lar to Shavell (1980) and Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), the initial contract
7[qo,To] speciﬁes party B’s constant performance choice qo ∈ Q,i nc o n s i d e r -
ation of which party A must pay To to B. Four cases will be distinguished
according to which party obtains private information and which party is
considering to breach the contract.
3.1 Case AB
In case AB it is party A who obtains private information but party B who
considers to breach. By deciding q 6= qo, party B is neglecting his obligation
and, in principle at least, owes expectation damages in the amount of
D(r,θ,q)=m a x [ V (r,θ,q
o) − V (r,θ,q),0] (2)
to party A. If party A were awarded such damages then she would be at
least as well oﬀ as if B had met his obligation. More precisely, if V (r,θ,q o)−
V (r,θ,q) ≥ 0 then she would be exactly as well oﬀ, well in line with ex-
pectation damages, whereas, if V (r,θ,qo) − V (r,θ,q) < 0 she even enjoys
a windfall gain from B’s neglecting his obligation. Following common legal
practice, it is assumed that A may keep such windfall gains for free. Yet, as
θ remains private information of the buyer, courts may not be able to award
state-contingent damages D(r,θ,q) correctly.
To cope with hidden information, imagine that the informed party A is
required to communicate a message m out of a set of alternative messages M.
Party A must send her message after she has obtained private information
θ ∈ Θ but before performance choice q ∈ Q is due. The message is known to
aﬀect the net payment, which A owes to B and which may further depend on
party A’s actual reliance investments as well as on B’s performance decision.
This transfer schedule is denoted by T(r,m,q) if reliance investments can be
veriﬁed in front of courts and by T(m,q) if investments are hidden action.
Such a transfer schedule provides incentives that can be calculated by
backwards induction. At the performance stage, where actual reliance in-
vestments and the message are known, party B will choose his performance
decision according to
qB(r,m) ∈ argmax
q∈Q T(r,m,q) − C(q).
Anticipating B’s performance choice and having obtained private information
8θ, party A sends message
mA(r,θ) ∈ argmax
m∈M V (r,θ,q B(r,m)) − T(r,m,qB(r,m)).
Therefore, along the equilibrium path, performance choice as a function of
reliance investments and private information
η(r,θ)=qB(r,mA(r,θ))
will result and the net transfer will amount to
τ(r,θ)=T(r,mA(r,θ),η(r,θ))
such that the informed party A’s net payoﬀ will be
I(r,θ)=V (r,θ,η(r,θ)) − τ(r,θ) − r.
This state-contingent payoﬀ (and the underlying transfer schedule) is said to
reﬂect expectation damages correctly if
I(r,θ)=m a x[ V (r,θ,q
o),V(r,θ,η(r,θ))] − T
o − r
holds for all information parameters θ. In fact, buyer A would then be
awarded correct expectation damages, at least along the equilibrium path.
Reﬂecting correct expectation damages comes at a cost, as the following
proposition shows. While it may still be feasible to provide eﬃcient reliance
incentives, in the light of Lema 1, the solution will typically fail to be ex post
eﬃcient.
Proposition 1 Suppose assumptions (a) and (c) are met. If the transfer
schedule T(r,m,q) is reﬂecting correct expectation damages along the equi-
librium path then party B will meet his obligation, i.e. η(r,θ) ≡ qo even if





which are eﬃcient under a contract stipulating qo = qoo (if qoo exists).
Recall from the previous section that, under suitable diﬀerentiability, qoo
will exist if performance choice is of continuous type. If, however, perfor-
mance choice is binary then underinvestment and overinvestment would re-
sult from a contract specifying qo = qL and qo = qH, respectively, as follows
from Lemma 2.
9The proof of the above proposition combines the incentive constraints
that result from rational play with A’s net payoﬀ if correct legal damages
were awarded. Details are provided in the appendix.
The next proposition shows a transfer schedule T∗(m,q) to exist that
leads to the ﬁrst best solution even if reliance investments are hidden ac-
tion. However, as follows from Proposition 1, the eﬃcient transfer schedule
T∗(m,q) cannot reﬂect expectation damages correctly.
Proposition 2 A message space M and a transfer schedule T∗(m,q) exists
that lead, in equilibrium, to the ﬁrst best solution.
The proof of Proposition 2 will be given at the end of the next subsection.
The eﬃcient price schedule will be based on the direct, incentive-compatible
m e c h a n i s mt h a tf o l l o w sf r o mt h ea n a l y s i so fc a s eA Aa sab y - p r o d u c t .
To conclude this subsection, let me brieﬂy compare the present ﬁndings
that were derived under asymmetric information with those that would hold
if the information parameter could be veriﬁed and, hence, correct damages
(2) could be administered by courts. Suppose, assumptions (b) and (c) are
met. If the contract speciﬁes high performance qo = qH then party B has
the incentive to take the socially best response as his performance choice.
Ex post eﬃciency would be ensured. Yet, party A’s net payoﬀ would then
amount to V (r,θ,q H) − To − r such that A is facing excessive incentives for
reliance investments as follows from Lemma 2 and (1).
If, at the other extreme, the contract speciﬁes low performance qo = qL
then party B would stick to the contract. If such an outcome is anticipated
under complete information, the parties would be able to renegotiate to a
p e r f o r m a n c ec h o i c et h a ti se xp o s te ﬃcient. Since party A would obtain only
a fraction of, say, 50 percent of the renegotiation surplus, A’s incentives for
reliance investments would be suboptimal.
In Shavell’s setting of binary performance choice, the high performance
c o n t r a c ti st h eo n l yo n ea v a i l a b l e( t h el o wp e r f o r m a n c ec o n t r a c tw o u l db e
equivalent to no contract) and would provide excessive incentives for re-
liance investments indeed. In the Edlin and Reichelstein setting of continuous
performance choice, however, there exist intermediate levels of performance
choice that would provide eﬃcient reliance incentives. In this sense, Sha-
vell’s overreliance result is due to binary performance choice and not to a
10basic defect of expectation damages.2
3.2 Case AA
In case AA, it is party A who obtains private information and who considers
to breach. Since party A is thought of as a buyer, breach would probably
be of the anticipatory type. After having obtained her private information,
party A may announce that she is only going to accept delivery q 6= qo.S i n c e ,
at the time of announcement, B has not yet started production, to mitigate
damages, B should deliver q but claim damages to compensate for proﬁts lost
from A’s announcement. In any case, B must grant a reduction of payments




o) − C(q)] − C(q)=T
o − C(q
o).
Party B is as well oﬀ as in the absence of anticipatory breach. Notice, in
case AA where B does not obtain private information, this price reduction
can easily be administered by courts.
If party A announces anticipatory breach q 6= qo,h e rn e tp a y o ﬀ amounts
to
Φ(r,θ,q)=V (r,θ,q) − T
o +[ C(q
o) − C(q)] − r = W(r,θ,q)+C(q
o) − T
o
and is, up to terms independent of actual performance, equal to social sur-
plus. Hence, party A’s performance choice in equilibrium solves
qA(r,θ) ∈ argmax
q∈Q Φ(r,θ,q)=a r gm a x
q∈Q W(r,θ,q)
and coincides with the socially best response. Anticipating such choice at















2For details, the reader is referred to Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) and, even closer in
line with the present setting, to Schweizer (2005).
3Notice, for ease of exposition, windfall gains arising from deviations are ruled out in
the treatment of case AA.
11would hold. In case AA, the ﬁr s tb e s ts o l u t i o nc a nb ei m p l e m e n t e db y
just requiring the producer to mitigate damages resulting from anticipatory
breach.
Such practice gives rise to a direct and eﬃcient mechanism, which is
incentive compatible and which works even if reliance investments are hidden
action. Under this mechanism, the informed party A is directly asked to
reveal his private information. Imagine that the true information is θ but A
reports θ
0 ∈ Θ which may be false. The direct mechanism then imposes the
performance choice η(θ
0)=q∗(θ
0) that would be the socially best response
if A had invested eﬃciently and reported truthfully. Moreover, party A is
required to pay τ(θ
0)=C(q∗(θ
0)) to party B. This direct mechanism is of the
Clarke-Groves type. It provides the following incentives.
Suppose party A makes reliance investments r and plans to reveal in-
formation θ
0 = t(r,θ) if she later obtains private information θ.A t t h e











and cannot be higher than if A had invested eﬃciently and revealed truthfully.
In this sense, the above direct mechanism is incentive compatible, assigns
the social surplus to A and, as a consequence, provides eﬃcient investment
incentives to A. To gain the consent of B, A would have to make an up-front
payment that, however, would not aﬀect incentives. In fact, with up-front
payment To − C(qo), the direct mechanism would lead to exactly the same
solution as if the producer must grant a price reduction for anticipatory
breach in the amount of cost savings.
This direct mechanism may also serve as a basis for the eﬃcient transfer
schedule T∗(m,q), whose existence is claimed by Proposition 2. In fact, take
as message space M = Θ. If A has announced m = θ
0 ∈ M = Θ and B takes




o + C(q) − [V (r
∗,θ






provides eﬃcient incentives. Indeed, since B is compensated for actual pro-
duction costs, he has the incentive to minimize the square term by deciding
q = q∗(θ











12and, obviously, provides incentives to report truthfully and to invest eﬃ-
ciently. The only diﬀerence with the direct mechanism arises from the fact
that, under the eﬃcient transfer schedule, the breach decision is inalienably
assigned to party B whereas, under the direct mechanism, it is exogenously
imposed by the operator of the mechanism. In equilibrium, however, the
eﬃcient price schedule and the direct mechanism are leading to the same
outcome.4 Proposition 2 is established.
3.3 Case BA
In case BA it is party B who obtains private information but it is party A
who considers to breach. Again, breach is assumed to be of the anticipatory
type. If A announces in time to accept delivery q 6= qo only, in principle,
B must grant a reduction of payments in the amount of his cost savings
C(θ,qo)−C(θ,q). Due to hidden information, however, courts may no longer
be able to administer such a price reduction correctly.
As in case BA, to cope with hidden information, imagine that the in-
formed party B is required to communicate a message m out of a set of
alternative messages M. Party B must send his message after he has ob-
tained private information θ ∈ Θ but before the performance decision q ∈ Q
is due. The message is known to aﬀect the net payment, which A owes to
B and which may also depend on A’s performance decision. The transfer
schedule is denoted by T(r,m,q) if reliance investments can be veriﬁed in
front of courts and by T(m,q) if investments are hidden action.
Case BA can now be handled along the same line as case AB. It turns out
again that transfer schedules reﬂecting the price reduction correctly will lead
party A to meeting her obligation even if breach were eﬃcient. Moreover,
under continuous performance choice, it may again be feasible to provide
eﬃcient incentives for reliance investments. Nonetheless, due to ex post inef-
ﬁciencies, the ﬁrst best will typically not be reached if the transfer schedule
reﬂects the price reduction correctly.
By the appropriate revelation mechanism, however, the ﬁrst best solution
could easily be implemented as follows from adapting Proposition 2 to case
BA. Details are left to the reader.
4For the general version of the taxation principle that is at stake, see Guesnerie (1995).
133.4 Case BB
In case BB, it is party B who obtains private information and who considers
to breach. If B delivers q 6= qo, then B owes damages
D(r,q)=m a x[ V (r,q
o) − V (r,q),0]
to A. Since A does not obtain private information, such damages can be
veriﬁed in front of courts provided that reliance investments are observable.
B’s net payoﬀ then amounts to
Ψ(r,θ,q)=T
o − C(θ,q) − max[V (r,q
o) − V (r,q),0]
and, hence, B takes performance decision
qB(r,θ) ∈ argmax
q∈Q Ψ(r,θ,q).
If the contract speciﬁes a delivery choice qo such that, under the socially best
response, windfall gains will never arise then B’s net payoﬀ
Ψ(r,θ,q)=T
o + V (r,q) − C(θ,q) − V (r,q
o)
would coincide, up to terms that do not depend on performance choice, with
social surplus. As a consequence, party B would have the incentive to choose
the socially best response.
In contrast to case AA, however, performance decisions qo that avoid
windfall gains may be at odds with eﬃcient reliance incentives. In fact, A’s




such that reliance incentives may be excessive if the contract speciﬁes a per-
formance choice that avoids windfall gains. Notice, a similar conﬂict between
ex post eﬃciency and eﬃcient reliance incentives did not arise in case AA
where it was the investing party A who obtained private information and
considered to breach.
4 Legal practice facing hidden information
Legal practice facing problems of asymmetric information either takes resort
to objectifying damage measures or allows to opt for reliance damages. The
14present section examines such practice. The issue of veriﬁability arises in the
two cases AB and BA where the uninformed party considers to breach such
that expectation damages must be based on the informed party’s proﬁto r
utility function. This function depends on the private information of that
party and, hence, cannot be veriﬁed in front of courts.
In the setting of case AB, objectifying expectation damages would mean
to ﬁctitiously postulate an objective type θ
o ∈ Θ, based on which expectation
damages amounting to
D
o(r,q)=m a x[ V (r,θ
o,q
o) − V (r,θ
o,q),0]
would be awarded to party A. Of course, A’s private information may actually
diﬀer from the objective type.





that does not depend on any message from the informed party. Such sched-
ules must necessarily lead to an outcome that fails to be state-contingent. In
fact, party B would choose performance decision
qB(r) ∈ argmax
q∈Q T(r,q) − C(q),
independent of the actual state θ. Anticipating B’s performance choice, party
A makes reliance investments
rA ∈ argmax
r∈R E [V (r,θ,q B(r))] − T(r,qB(r) − r.
While it may still be feasible to generate eﬃcient reliance incentives, the
solution typically fails to be ex post eﬃcient because performance choice is
constant, no matter which move of nature has materialized.
Some legal systems including the German5 one allow the promisee to
opt for recovery of reliance expenditures instead of expectation damages.
Allegedly, the option was introduced to accommodate promisees that have
diﬃculties to verify their true expectation damages in front of courts. Yet,
since reliance damages are also leading to an eﬀective transfer schedule T(r,q)
that does not depend on nature’s move, ex post eﬃciency would neither be
restored.
5See § 284 BGB (German Civil Code).
15To sum up, practical solutions of awarding damages under asymmetric
information seem defective on two accounts. First, they fail to assess expec-
tation damages correctly. If granted such damages, the promisee need not
be equally well oﬀ as if the promisor had met his obligation. Second, the
outcome will be constant over states and, as such, will typically fail to be ex
post eﬃcient.
5C o n c l u s i o n
For a reliance setting with hidden information, the present paper has estab-
lished that a trade-oﬀ exists between providing eﬃcient incentives and as-
sessing expectation damages correctly. Provisions that would allow to assess
expectation damages correctly prevent eﬃcient breach of contract whereas
revelation mechanisms leading to the ﬁrst best solution would fail to assess
damages correctly.
Legal practice seems to be relying on two remedies. First, damages may
be awarded that are of an objective type. This approach is shown to be
defective as it neither assesses expectation damages correctly nor does it pro-
vide incentives for eﬃcient breach. Second, the party suﬀering from breach
and failing to verify her expectation damages in front of courts may opt
for recovery of reliance damages instead. The outcome, again, cannot be
state-contingent and, hence, ex post eﬃciency will not be achieved.
Since revelation mechanisms were available that would generate the ﬁrst
best solution, at least for the present setting, justifying such legal practice
from the economic perspective remains a challenging task for future research.
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7A p p e n d i x
In this appendix, the proof of Proposition 1 is presented. The proposition
deals with case AB where it is party A who obtains private information
but party B who has the option to breach. Suppose the transfer schedule
T(r,m,q) gives rise, in equilibrium, to the performance choice η(r,θ) and the
transfer payment τ(r,θ) as explained in the subsection on the case AB. The
informed party’s equilibrium payoﬀ then amounts to
I(r,θ)=V (r,θ,η(r,θ)) − τ(r,θ) − r.
The following lemma is well-known from mechanism design: The incentive
constraints are met and equilibrium performance is a monotonically increas-
ing function of private information.
Lemma 3 Suppose assumption (a) is met. Then, for all θ,θ
0 ∈ Θ,i th o l d s
that
V (r,θ
0,η(r,θ)) − V (r,θ,η(r,θ)) ≤ I(r,θ
0) − I(r,θ) ≤
≤ V (r,θ
0,η(r,θ
0)) − V (r,θ,η(r,θ
0)).
Moreover, if θ < θ
0 then η(r,θ) ≤ η(r,θ
0).
Proof. Since the message sent maximizes the informed party A’s payoﬀ it
follows that
I(r,θ)=V (r,θ,q B(r,mA(r,θ)) − T(r,mA(r,θ),q B(r,mA(r,θ))) − r
= V (r,θ,η(r,θ)) − τ(r,θ) − r
≥ V (r,θ,q B(r,m)) − T(r,mA(r,θ,q B(r,m))) − r
17must hold for any other message m ∈ M. In particular, this must be true
for the message m = mA(r,θ
0) that A would have sent in equilibrium after
having obtained private information θ
0. It follows that
I(r,θ) ≥ V (r,θ,q B(r,mA(r,θ
0)) − T(r,mA(r,θ
0),q B(r,mA(r,θ




from which the second inequality of the lemma follows easily.
The ﬁrst inequality follows from a similar argument for the situation
where the true information is θ
0 but the informed party has revealed θ instead.
Moreover, the monotonicity of performance choice as a function of private
information follows from the single-crossing property (assumption (a)) and
the two inequalities that have just been established.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .Let
θ
o =s u p {θ ∈ Θ : η(r,θ) ≤ q
o}
denote the supremum of all moves of nature, under which the performance
choice does not exceed the quantity speciﬁed in the contract. It then follows
from the monotonicity established in Lemma 3 that, for θ < θ




o,t h e n
V (r,θ
00,η(r,θ
0)) − V (r,θ
0,η(r,θ
0)) ≤ V (r,θ
00,q





00)) − V (r,θ
0,η(r,θ
00))
because, in this range of information parameters, A’s payoﬀ i st h es a m ea si f
B had met his obligation. It then follows from the single crossing property
that η(r,θ
0) ≤ qo ≤ η(r,θ





For any θ < θ
o, consider two information parameters θ
0 < θ < θ
00 <
θ
o from this range and apply the above ﬁndings pairwise. In particular,
η(r,θ
0) ≤ qo ≤ η(r,θ) and η(r,θ) ≤ qo ≤ η(r,θ
00) must both hold, from which
it follows that η(r,θ)=qo must be constant over the range (θL,θ
o).
Next, consider information parameters from the range θ
o < θ < θH.F o r
such parameters, qo < η(r,θ) must hold as follows from the monotonicity of
the equilibrium performance choice. Moreover, in this range, the net payoﬀ
of party A amounts to
I(r,θ)=V (r,θ,η(r,θ)) − r − T
o,
18which, combined with the incentive constraints from Lemma 3, is leading to
V (r,θ
00,η(r,θ
0)) − V (r,θ
0,η(r,θ
0)) ≤ V (r,θ
00,η(r,θ





00)) − V (r,θ
0,η(r,θ
00))
for any two information parameters in the range θ
o < θ
0 < θ










00)) ≤ V (r,θ
0,η(r,θ
0)).
It then follows from the monotonicity of utility as a function of performance





will be constant in this range as well.
Consider, ﬁnally, an information parameter θ < θ
o < θ
0 from each range.





and from the incentive constraints that
I(r,θ
0) − I(r,θ)=V (r,θ
0,q




0)) − V (r,θ,η(r,θ
0)) = V (r,θ
0,q
0) − V (r,θ,q
0)
and, hence, that V (r,θ,q0) ≤ V (r,θ,qo) must hold. By making use of the
monotonicity of utility as a function of performance choice, it follows that
qo = q0 must hold. Proposition 1 is established.
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